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Resonance Imaging (fMRI) in Education
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Burhanettin Keskin
University of Mississippi
Abstract

This paper is aimed at addressing some of the main issues with regard to use of
neuroimaging (i.e., fMRI) in educational settings; such as the issue of equating structure
with function; the issue of finding an accurate reference point for normal brain structure and
function; issues due to brain plasticity; and issues related to the interpretation of
neuroimaging findings. In addition, the implications of such concerns were addressed. It was
concluded that the lack of research on the issues regarding the use of neuroimaging
jeopardizes the possible use of such unique technology and any educational practice based
on neuroimaging would be at best prematurely done unless such issues are satisfactorily
addressed. We should leave open the possibility and viability that neuroscience (inclusive of
neuroimaging) can, and perhaps should indeed be used to develop educational programs, but
if (if and only if) pragmatic assessment of both the science/technology and its ethical, legal
and sociocultural implications and manifestations are thoroughly engaged and leveraged.
Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) has transformed the
empirical study of the human mind in the
21st century in a fundamental way. The
groundbreaking research involving the use
of fMRI brought a variety of arguments on
what fMRI can and cannot tell to ethical,
legal, social issues and the implications of
use of such technology in many domains
including education (see Berker, 2009,
Celone & Stern, 2009; Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen,
2001 and Raizada, & Kriegeskorte, 2010).
Despite the abundance of studies either
utilizing fMRI or addressing fMRI, the issue
of the use of fMRI is continuing to be a
vigorous area of research.
fMRI is a non-invasive brain
imaging technique that does not involve
radiation (Byars, Holland, Strawsburg,
Bommer, Dunn, Schmithorst, & Plante,
2002). fMRI has opened a new window into
neuroimaging by attempting to provide real
time information on the functions of the
brain. It is based on a technology, which

provides functional maps of the working
brain by tracking changes in the magnetic
signals resulting from oxygenated and
deoxygenated hemoglobin (Gligorov &
Krieger, 2010; Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, &
Glynn, 1990; Vanmeter, 2010). This method
is known as BOLD (Blood Oxygenation
Level Dependent). Neural activation
produces a physical effect on red blood cells
by moving them from a state of oxygenation
to deoxygenation (Cumming & Ramsey,
2009). While the magnetic field produced by
oxygenated hemoglobin has almost no effect
(or no effect) on the MRI signal,
deoxygenated hemoglobin has a weak effect
on the MRI signal (Vanmeter, 2010). Even
though changes in such signals are very
small, they can be detected while the subject
is performing cognitive tasks (Celone &
Stern, 2009; Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, & Glynn,
1990). Here, fMRI attempts to pair the
neural activity with local cerebral blood
flow. The changes in the blood flow are
associated with the task the individual is
engaged in (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2001).
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reference point for normal brain structure
and function?” For instance, functional
imaging can produce different results based
on the technique it utilizes; oxygen
consumption (fMRI) versus glucose
utilization (PET) (see, Fox, & Raichle,
1986; Fox, Raichle, Mintun, & Dence,
1988). “The BOLD contrast mechanism
reflects the input and intracortical
processing of a given area rather than its
spiking output” (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath,
Trinath & Oeltermann (2001, p.150).
Namely, while an fMRI signal detects the
input in the local field, it does not detect
total output with regard to the stimulus
(Kosik, 2003). There is vagueness
concerning reference point information
when attempting to address this issue
(Santosh 2000 and Wilke et al. 2003 as cited
in Fenton, Meynell, & Baylis, 2009).
Without a solid reference point, the validity
of fMRI findings would be questionable.

The groundbreaking research
involving the use of fMRI has brought a
variety of arguments from what fMRI can
and cannot tell, the implications of the use
of such technology in many domains
including education, and to the ethical, legal,
and social issues with regard to fMRI. Such
possible implications of the use of fMRI are
under question due to the validity issues
regarding fMRI findings.
1. Concerns with regard to the validity of
fMRI
1.1. Equating structure and function
Just because there is some activity in
the certain structure of the brain, does this
really mean that specific parts of the brain
are involved in the function? Another
question being raised is: “Does this activity
mean that the certain structure of the brain
alone is responsible for such function?”
(Racine, Bell, & Illes, 2010; Rosen & Gur,
2002; Illes, Racine, & Kirschen, 2006). A
false activation which can be caused by
ordinary things like eye-blink (see Desmond
& Chen, 2002) or movement during fMRI
scanning can pose a problem to the validity
of fMRI findings. Special types of statistical
analysis are required to eliminate such
distortion of the fMRI results (see Racine,
Bell, & Illes, 2010 and Vanmeter, 2010)
otherwise the validity of the result would be
questionable.

1.3. Brain plasticity
Given the fact that the brain has
plasticity, meaning lifelong capability of the
brain (1) to adjust itself (i.e., physically,
chemically or physiologically) to the
changes that occur in the environment and
(2) to recompense for brain trepidation,
including damage. One thing to remember
about plasticity is that it takes place in ways
that are not foreseeable. This means, the
same experience may affect the brain in
different ways (Kolb & Teskey, 2011)
intrapersonal and interpersonal. This raises a
question of the validity of the fMRI results
obtained from children (in terms of making
function-structure association) due to rapidly
changing characteristics of a child’s brain.

1.2. Accurate reference point for normal
brain structure and function
Due to the non-quantitative nature of
fMRI results, comparison of the results
obtained from more than one task is required
(VanMeter, 2010). The accuracy of the
reference point is a necessity for any
comparison, intrapersonal and interpersonal.
The question is “do we have an accurate
5
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1.6. Uniqueness of cognitive strategies

1.4. Subjective perceptions of qualitative
data

Because each individual is unique,
individuals may use their brain in different
ways. This means, the activation in the brain
of one individual might be quite different or
take place in different parts of the brain
compared to another individual who is
involved in the same cognitive task.

The question raised by Hanan A.
Alexander (2006) needs serious attention as
we make further moves with fMRI and its
educational implications: “how educational
researchers can believe the subjective
perceptions of qualitative participantobservers given the concern for objectivity
and generalisability of experimental research
in the behavioural and social sciences” (p.
205).

1.7. Statistical analysis of fMRI data
Statistical analysis employed to
correct the motion artifacts, setting the
threshold for a general linear model
regression, comparison of several tens
thousands of statistical analysis, and
obtaining false negatives and/or false
positives pose a serious concern with regard
to the accuracy of mapping brain function
attained from such complex analysis
(Racine, Bell, & Illes, 2010). The changes in
results of fMRI not related to the cognitive
task the individual is experiencing (i.e.,
number of hours of sleep before the
experiment, Habeck et al. 2004 as cited in
VanMeter, 2010) can pose a problem with
regard to the interpretation of the data.

1.5. Post hoc ergo propter hoc
Just because there is activity in
certain parts of the brain immediately after
the cognitive task has been performed, can
we say that task and activation are related or
have a causal relationship? The answer to
this question is “not always,” which brings
us the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc
issue (J. Giordano, personal communication,
July 2011). Post hoc ergo propter hoc
means “after this, therefore because of this”
in Latin, which refers to an erroneous logic
of causation between two events by the
faulty conclusion that an event is caused by
another event simply because it came after
it. Namely, if X occurs after Y, then Y is the
cause of X. Just because something is
followed by something else, does not
necessarily mean the former caused the
latter (Copi & Cohen, 1990; Lerner, 2002;
Schmookler, 1999). Even though there are
statistical techniques for preventing such
fallacy of indicating a cause-effect sequence,
yet, “unfortunately the number of variables
involved usually vastly exceeds the number
of equations to be worked with, which
means that analysis can yield no certain
answers” (Hardin, 1993, p.192).

2. Issues with regard to use of fMRI in
education of children
What are the possible uses of fMRI
in education? Some possible uses of fMRI in
the educational system are (1) to identify
students whose education could be promoted
by offering additional resources that are
more appropriate to their ‘perceived’
cognitive abilities (i.e., exceptional
learners); (2) to channel students into more
appropriate programs based on their
cognitive abilities; (3) to identify children
with potential troublesome dispositions (i.e.,
violent) (Celone, & Stern, 2009; Fenton,
Meynell, & Baylis, 2009). The question here
is whether or not fMRI can provide more
6
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accurate results than what is currently done
with psychological and behavioral testing
for diagnosing purposes. Even though,
currently, the answer to this question is
unclear, in the near future, validity and
interpretative issues with regard to fMRI
may be improved.

reductionism as labeled by Bennett and
Hacker (2003), also poses a problematic
view on the learning process. For instance,
according to Francis Crick (1995):
“The scientific belief is that our
minds—the behavior of our brains—
can be explained by the interactions
of nerve cells (and other cells) and
the molecules associated with them.*
This is to most people a really
surprising concept. It does not come
easily to believe that I am the
detailed behavior of a set of nerve
cells, however many there may be
and however intricate their
interactions” (p.7).

One of the main issues regarding the
use of fMRI in education is that the use of
such technology may lead to categorization
of children based on their neural
mechanism. Such categorization relies on
the assumption that all children use the same
neural process when they are learning. This
assumption simplifies the learning process
as there is more than one way of learning the
same subject/topic. Focusing on a single
component that is involved in learning (i.e.,
memory), reduces learning process to a
component of learning (Pierce, 2009). This
brings the issue of mereological fallacy (J.
Giordano, personal communication, July
2011), which refers to the logic of
establishing a relationship between parts and
the whole in a way that regards a part as if it
is the whole (Maslin, 2007). Referring to a
study skills booklet, Maslin (2007) gives an
example for such fallacy. According to this
booklet, the left hemisphere of the brain
thinks with words, while the right
hemisphere thinks with images and pictures.
Maslin argues that such claims are
meaningless as they attribute cognitive
activities to “the brain considered as a
whole, much less to parts of brains” (p.
211). This fallacy becomes especially
problematic in studies dealing with
neuroscience. 1 Similar to this fallacy,

Along with these simplifications
with regard to neural/cognitive process,
categorizing children based on their neural
mechanism, these assumptions disregard
individual differences in learning. As it is
clear for educators, individual differences in
learning varies greatly; while some are
visual learners others are auditory learners
or kinesthetic learners, to name a few.
Based on their learning style, individuals
may use different neural pathways in the
process of learning.
Would categorizing children based
on their neural mechanism lead to biological
determinism? To answer this question we
need to answer the following question “what
does such categorization entail?” It entails
the idea that the biological process alone
shapes neural mechanism. This brings us the
definition of biological determinism.
Biological determinism, sometimes called
genetic determinism, refers to the idea that

1

According to Bennett and Hacker (2003), assigning
psychological attributions, (i.e., thinking, believing,
interpreting, inferring, knowing, reasoning, deciding),
to the brain or a part/section of a brain (i.e., the
hemispheres or even neurons) are rooted from
Cartesianism, and are far from scientific claims,
rather philosophical claims. For a detailed discussion

of the mereological fallacy in neuroscience, see M. R.
Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker’s (2003) Philosophical
Foundations of Neuroscience. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing.
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human characteristics and behaviors are
shaped only by genes (De Melo-Martin,
2005). It is well known that biology is not
the only factor affecting the structure of the
brain. Experience also shapes the biology of
the brain. For this reason, neuroscience
cannot or should not lead to a biological
determinism (Farmer, 2010). If the brain is
changing based on the factors rooted in the
environment, then, the idea that genes alone
are responsible for human behaviors become
meaningless.

2.1. Parental consent issues
Parent consent issues mainly revolve
around health, safety, and privacy concerns.
Because fMRI is a relatively new
technology, its long terms effects on the
brain are simply unknown. Just because this
technology does not involve ionizing rays,
does it make it safe, especially for children
whose brains are rapidly changing? Because
of the possibility that children’s forming
brains might be at danger, it raises ethical
concerns. Would it be ethical for parents to
give consent for non-clinical use of fMRI on
their children given the possibility of
negative effect(s) of such technology?
Another issue regarding the parental consent
is if it is ethical for parents to not give
consent for non-clinical use of fMRI on their
children, which may limit their children’s
access to the best educational/health
practices. Do parents have rights to deprive
their children from a technology that could
benefit their children’s education? What is
the future of parental consent if fMRI
becomes a widely used technology? Would
we still need parental consent? Considering
that parental consent is not needed to test
children in school because it is a widely
used practice, will fMRI be perceived as a
common practice in the near future (J.
Giordano, personal communication, July
2011)?
Use of fMRI can also be perceived
as invasion of privacy of young children
who are unable to make a judgment about
such technology. Do parents have the right
to let their children be brain-scanned even if
it involves invasion of privacy? Would we,
adults, mind that our brain be scanned
knowing the possibility of invasion of
privacy? If our answer is no to this question,
then we have some thinking to do.

Even though embracing
neurotechnology does not necessarily lead to
biological determination, this does not mean
that neurotechnologies (including, but not
limited to fMRI) will not be used to
categorize children or adults.
Neurobiological determination of
social/practical categories, namely “neural
norming,” may lead to “Euneuromics,” 2
meaning neurologically based “good” or
“well.”
Another issue regarding the use of
fMRI in education involves the economical
feasibility of utilizing such technology in
educational settings. Given the economical
difficulties facing today’s educational
system, how feasible is it to utilize such
technology in educational settings? The
answer to this question is tied closely to the
validity, reliability and usefulness of fMRI.
The more studies conducted to address and
eliminate such issues, the easier and more
acceptable it would be to use fMRI in many
different settings including educational
settings. Once the main issues with regard to
the interpretative difficulties are addressed
properly and solutions are provided, the
doors to common use of fMRI would be
opened.

2

This term was generated by Dr. James Giordano.
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2.3. Information security.
In order to make sense of the fMRI
data collected by large groups of people,
comparison and sharing such data would be
necessary. Securing such a database would
be pivotal. How is this database going to be
secured? What are the possible implications
of failing to secure such data? What would
be done to avoid or minimize inappropriate
access, inapt use/misuse, data modification
(by others or the individual himself/herself)
and “downstream” effects (e.g.- individual
and group socio- legal and economic
demonstrations of accessed, misused or
manipulated datasets) (Giordano, in press)?

2.2. Information sharing
If fMRI becomes a commonly used
technology, who should have access to the
information obtained from fMRI? School
systems? In the case that abnormalities
having some possible educational
implications were discovered during nonclinical use of fMRI, should the school
system be involved? Insurance companies?
Should the information with regard to the
unexpectedly discovered abnormalities be
shared with insurance companies? If so, now
should the child be considered to have a preexisting condition (J. Giordano, personal
communication, July 2011)? What is the
acceptable practice for accessing such
information? What are the possible issues
with regard to sharing such information with
the child? How is this going to affect the
perception of the self? (Psychological
effects): Known self vs. newly constructed
self, based on the results of fMRI. How is
this going to affect the perception of others?
(Sociological effects): Am I superior to the
other kids? Do I deserve better than what I
am offered? or “I knew there was
something wrong with me, now I have the
proof.”

2.4. Use of fMRI for cognitive
enhancement in children
Brain mapping in terms of function
may lead to the cognitive enhancement
argument. If fMRI results show an abnormal
or inadequate functioning in certain part of
the child’s brain, this information may be
utilized to either minimize the abnormality
or enhance the cognitive skills. This brings
the issue of “the ethics of enhancement.”
Julian Savulescu (2009) listed the three main
arguments with regard to the ethics of
enhancement in humans. The first argument
deals with the notion that the decision of not
to enhance is wrong. The focal point of this
argument is that if enhancement is going to
improve the child’s life, failure to provide
such enhancement would be unethical. It is
like depriving a child from a dietary
supplement that would provide a stunning
intellectual result. The second argument is
that we need to be consistent with regard to
different types of enhancement. We use
environment to enhance children’s lives.
Cognitive/biological enhancements should
not be considered any differently because
environmental enhancements change our
biology as well. If we are okay with the idea
to change our biology with environmental

How would information sharing
affect the child’s school performance? “The
more I know about how my brain works, the
more I can adjust my strategies (and/or my
environment) to learn” (positive effect). “If I
am the brightest, do I really have to work
hard anymore?” “I knew there was
something wrong with me, I shouldn’t even
try anymore!” (Negative effect). There is
also a possibility that sharing such
information would not affect the child’s
school performance (no effect).

9
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While addressing the enhancement
issue, Michael J. Sandel talks about a worry
of generating two categories of human
beings: the enhanced and the unenhanced
(natural). Sandel (2009) argues that the real
issue is not the access issue but the moral
issue of enhancement and states that “the
fundamental question is not how to ensure
equal access to enhancement but whether we
should aspire to it in the first place” (p. 892).
This question must be clearly answered
before any policy making takes place.

enhancements, then we should be consistent
and approach biological enhancement in the
same manner. The third argument revolves
around the idea that if we were to be open to
treatment, we should also be open to
enhancements; therefore, enhancements
should not be considered any differently
than alleviating/treating disease. Preventing
a disease or treating a disease leads to a
good life, so do the enhancements.
These arguments listed by Savulescu
have strong points to consider, yet, it does
not mean that there are no possible ethical
concerns associated with such
enhancements. One of the pivotal questions
to be answered is “how far is too far with
manipulation of biology or embracement of
cognitive enhancements?”

As our knowledge about how our
brain works progresses, such knowledge will
hold potential to have a huge impact on
every aspect of our life, including but not
limited to education. Policies addressing
neuroethics cannot be made without the
existence of progressive and integrative
neuroethics that generate some benefit vs.
risk analysis (Giordano, 2011 as cited in
Giordano, in press). That is, neuroethics
must develop enough to produce
multidisciplinary perspective on benefits vs.
risks analysis of using such technology.
Developing a framework is a pivotal step
with regard to policy making. To do so,
implementing workshops and discussions
among various disciplines is pivotal. Shared
responsibility among regularity agencies and
scientists from various backgrounds would
provide means for protection and
improvement of human life.

2.5. Policy issues
Policy issues are closely related to
justice issues. If fMRI becomes a widely
used technology for enhancing children’s
cognitive skills or eliminating possible
future abnormalities, “who would receive
this technology” would become one of the
central questions; children who really need
this technology to prevent abnormalities or
children whose parents can afford such
technology to enhance their children’s
cognitive skills.
If neurocognitive enhancements
become prevalent, it is probable that it will
not be rightfully available for all. However,
such possible imbalanced access to
neurocognitive enhancements should not be
used as an excuse to prohibit these
technological improvements as it is not the
case for the practices performed by the
prosperous such as tutoring or cosmetic
surgery (Farah et al., 2010).

3. Is the use of fMRI in education a
science fiction or is it already happening?
Neurotechnology is already in use in
our daily life including the educational
domain. For instance there are educational
toys produced by neuroscientists. It seems
that with the improvement on the
neurotechnologies (i.e., fMRI), it is safe to
assume that such technology would not be
limited to educational toys. More common
10
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uses of fMRI in the domain of education
depend heavily on the questions/issues
raised in related literature. We have to
answer at least the following questions to
put fMRI into perspective: What can fMRI
tell us about brain functions in children?
What can fMRI not tell us about brain
functions in children? What are the benefits
and risks involving fMRI? These questions
along with several other questions raised in
this study may seem to involve an unlikely
situation but exercising our judgment on
such questions would help us be more
prepared for use of fMRI.

education of children, such concerns must
be eliminated or at least minimized as much
as possible. fMRI is a powerful technology
that can be used to improve not only
pedagogy but also educational settings.
However, the lack of research addressing the
issues mentioned above jeopardizes the
possible use of such unique technology. Any
educational practice based on fMRI (i.e.,
funneling students into appropriate
educational programs, Celone & Stern,
2009) would be at best prematurely done
unless such issues are satisfactorily
addressed. To do that, a multidisciplinary
approach is a necessity.

4. Conclusion
Acknowledgements:

While novel technologies often
provide new prospects that offer potentials
for improving people’s lives, technologies
also bring novel ethical concerns. It would
be premature to dismiss the possible use of
fMRI in educational purposes because of the
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technology. It is obvious that more research
is needed to guide the policies otherwise
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children due to misguided policy making. 3
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